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Nigeria Industrial Development Bank Limited
To en and not ret'orm may indeed be called error - Cont'ucius
(551 - 479 BC)
growth.

INTRODUCTION
In a short span of a dozen years, its
economic performance has deteriorated so rapidly that sub-Saharan
Africa is now the poorest, the most
heavily indebted and the least developed region of the world. In 1981,
the per capita income of Sub-Saharan Africa amounted to US$600,
equivalent to one and half times the
per capita income of East Asia and
Pacific and over two times the per
capita income of South Asia. Twelve
years later, the per capita income of
Africa has dedined to US$340,
equivalent to less than half the per
capita of East Asia and almost the
same level as South Asia (Table 1).
Moreover, the indicators of social
development and infrastucture penehation have stagnated while its total
external debt stock at end of 1995
amounted to 74 per cent of gross
national product (GNP) as compared
with 29 per cent for East Asia and 39
per cent for South Asia. This high
level of external indebtedness has
eroded macroeconomic stabilip and
hampered private investment and
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.ln 1980, African Heads of State
adopted the Lagos Plan of Action to
promote self-reliance in food production and self-sustaining industrialisation and declared the 1980's the
Indushial Development Decade for
Africa. In retrospect, the 1980's can
be considered the Indusbial Development Debacle of Africa. Notwithstanding the widespread adoption of
Stuuctural Adjustment Programme
(SAP), the economic performance of
Sub-Saharan Africa has continued
to deteriorate in the first half of the
1990's. Africa has experienced little
growth of exports, has athacted no
private capital flows and has been
mired in a vicious circle of heary
indebtedness, low investment and
poor growth.
To what extent is Africa's predicament self-inflicted and to what extent
is Africa a victim of hostile international forces? In the light of rapid
advances in technological innovation and globalisation, what policies
should Africa adopt to gain competitive advantage and foster economic
recovery? Given the acute shortage
of external financing, how can Africa's financialsystem be revamped to
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mobilise household saving? What i's
appropriate role of development finance and capitalmarkets in financing Africa's economic recovery?
The paper examines the impact of
Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAP) on investment and growth in
Africa and suggests the need for a
new development paradigm. Working in partnership with the private
sector, African Governments must
establish a sound institutional and
incentive framework for rapid growth.
An alternative development skategy
should be market-friendly and people-cenhed and must give priority to
the accelerated expansion of exports
and Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs). In view of the bleak prospects for external financing, Africa
must rely on domestic financial institutions and capitalmarkets to mobilise the required financial resources
for economic recovery.

THE LESSONS OF
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
The Elements of Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP)
Africa became the poorest region of
the world through the combined effects of institutional and infrashuctural

constraints, growth-retarding domestic factors and hostile external
developments. Institutional conshaints such as intrusive government,
weak enforcement of contracts, corruption and ethnic diversity tended to
increase transaction costs and discourage private investment. The do-

mestic factors included poor
macroeconomic and sectorial policies, weak financial systems, low
school attainment and political instability. Although most African economies have experienced income losses
from declining terms of trade since
7970, these have been partly offset
by higher net externalhansfers.
In the 1960s and 1970s, almost all
African counhies pursued an inward-
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oriented policy of induskalisation
based on import substitution, restuic-

tive trade and exchange policies and
extensive government ownership of
commercial enterprises and financial
institutions. The decline in the terms
of hade and the external debt crisis in
the early 1980s exposed the weaknesses of this development shategy.
In the late 1980s, many African coun-

hies adopted Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAP) that were designed and sponsored by the Bretton
Woods Institutions (BWI), namely the
International Monetary Fund (lMF)
and the World Bank.
Between 1987 and L997, twentynine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
implemented SAP with the aim of
restoring macroeconomic stability,
reducing the economic role of the
state and creating an incentive framework for private sector investment
and growth (World Bank, 1994). The
broad policy prescriptions of SAP
included the depreciation of the real
exchange rate to improve the balance of payments, restrictive fiscal
and credit policies to reduce overall
expenditure and curb inflationary
pressures, and trade liberalisation and
financial sector reform to enhance
growth of the real sector. In most
cases, the World Bank and IMF
granted strucfural and sectoral adjustmentloans in supportof SAP and
pledged to mobilise additional resources from extemal donors.
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macroeconomic policy stancb in
1990-91 as compared with the best
performers in other developing regions. Regarding the impact of SAP,

the World Bank has claimed that
countries that improved their
macroeconomic policies also increased their GDP per capita growth
rates. However, gross domestic investment did not respond positively
to improved macroeconomic policies. The same general conclusions
were reached by a recent study up-

dating the World Bank report

(Bouton, 7994) and a review of the
experience of 19 low-income countries that implemented the Enhanced
Shuctural Adjustment Facility of the
MF (Schadler, 1993).
The claimed pay-offs to SAP notwithstanding, Africa is still in the grip
of a prohacted economic recession
with little prospects of catching-up
with other developing regions of the
world. What then are the lessons of
SAP for Africa?
Firstly, SAP placed undue emphasis on restrictive macroeconomic
policies which many studies have
shown to account for only part of the
differences in relative long-term
growth performance. In a recent
analysis of economic growth during
the period 1960-89, macroeconomic
policies explained less than two fifths
of the difference in growth rates of
real per capita GDP between nonAfrican and Africa countries (Easterly'and Levine, 1995). Africa's poor
growth performance is found to be
Lessons of SAP
significantly associated with other
Naturally, the World Bank and IMF variables including low school attainhave hailedSAP as asuccessin coun- ment, political instability, inadequate
hies that rigorously follow its policy infrasfuucture, ethnic diversity and
prescriptions. Of twenty-six African spill-overs of growth performance
countuies for which comparative data between neighbouring counhies.
Secondly, SAP was implemented
were available, the World Bank has
argued that fifteen countries have with little regard to the sequencing
improved their macroeconomic poli- and timing of reform policies. For
cies between the period 1981-86 to example, some countries impleL987-9L with Ghana recording the mented trade liberalisation and filargest improvement. However, none nancial reform policies even before
of the countries achieved a good the restoration of macro-economic
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stabilip.
Thirdly, regarding its impact on the
real sector, SAP was accompanied
by virtually no increase in gross invesfnent and national saving and
has worsened the plight of Small.and
Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
(Okonkwo, 1995).
Fourthly, the associated policies of
interest rate deregulation and lax licensing of banks have conkibuted to
the spread of banking distress in many
counhies. In view of the weak system
of banking supervision and the underdeveloped nature of Africa's financialsystem, the solvency of existing institutions should have been an
overriding concern of financial reform.

Towards an Economic Recovery
Programme (ERP) For Africa
As a strategy for Africa's economic
recovery, SAP is deeply flawed by its
faulty ideological underpining, its
relatively short planning period and
its lame promises of externalfinancing. An alternative development
strategy should avoid these shortcomings while focusing on the pivotal
role of Africa's financial markets in
meeting the challenge'of economic
recovery.
The Case for an Economic
Recovery Programme (ERP)

A search for an effective economic
recovery shategy should re-examine
the proper role of the state in the
process of economic cievelopment.
The ideology of SAP is the neoclassical paradigm of laissez-faire which
holds thatthe unfettered operation of
perfecfly competitive markets will lead
to an efficient solution that maximizes
the economic welfare of market participants.

Under this model, the interplay of

demand and supply determines
equilibrium market prices (Adam
Smith's Invisible Hand) which guide
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ment of commercial enterprises.
Wherever possible, Government

the economy to an optimal outcome
with no role for govemment. To quote

the World Bank, "The reform pro- should intensify the privatisation of
grams that many African counties 'state-owned enterprises, preferably
initiated in the mid 1980s - witti the 'through the capital markets with a
support of the Intemational Monetary view to generating fiscal revenue,
Fund, the World Banll and other improving effi ciency and broadening
donors - reflected a new paradigm:. share ownership.
Secondly, it is the supreme reThe reforms attempted to reduce the
state's role in production and in regu- sponsibilip of Government to prolating private economic activity. The vide sbategic leadership for economic
process of revamping the policy recovery. The objectives and policies
frameworkin line with this newpara- of the recovery plan should be predigm became known as Stuctural pared after the fullest consultation
Adjustment" (Page 34, World Bank, with the major stakeholders in the
economy namely, the public sector,
L9941.
Unfortunately, the key assrrmptions employers, wolkers, farmers and
of the neoclassical model (narnely, bankers. This process of consultation
free and perfect information, per- would have obvious implications for
fecfly specified property rights, zero political govemance, the capacity of
fuansaction cost and complete mar- the economic bureaucracy and the
kets) do not apply in developing machinery for policy formulation and
lcounties. Some economists have coordination.
Thirdly, while economic recovery
lrecognized this serious limitation and
haw explicitly allowed for institutional should be measured by a specified
sfructure and bansaction costs in ex- rate of growth of real per capita inplaining the disparity in the perform- come, the policies to that end should
ance of economic across regions and 'be market-friendly and people-centhrough time (North, 1990; Stein, tred.
1995). Other Studies have observed
Fourthly, Government should not
the pervasive incidence of market hesitate to selectparticular sectors for
failure in financial markets of devel- accelerated development and prooped and developingeconomies and

vide the incdntives and resources required to attain the sectorial objectives. The priority sectors could include manufactured exports, and

have called for the active involvement by the state in the promotion of
financial intermediation (Stiglitz,
L9941. The so-called East Asian
miracle was largely wrought by a
proactive partnership between Gov-

Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs) in both agricultural and industrial sectors. Public expenditure
should be focused on primary and
technical education, basic health, legal and industial infrastructure and
industrial technology.

emment and the private sector (World
Bank, 1993).

The fifty-two counhies of Africa
face differentpolitical, institutional and

resource consbaints and no single
development strategy can apply
equally to all of them. Nevertheless, a
few broad themes of an Economic
Recovery Programme (ERP) can be
formulated.
Firstly, the private sector should
serve as the engine of economic recovery since private business is generally more efficient in the manage-
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risome is the sharp drop of private
investment from 11 per cent of GDP
in 1981toonly8percentin 1993. To
attain the desired increase in private
invEstmen! Govemment must es.
tablish a stable macroeconomic and
incentive framework while seekin'{to
mobilise the required resources from
extemal and domestic sources.

The Prospects for Extemal
Financing
In 1995, Sub-Saharan Africareceived
private capital flows of US$5 billion
as compared with US$157 billion for
East fuia. As a share of total longterm resource flows to developing
counbies, private capital flows (comprising mainly foreign direct investment and porffolio investment) have
increased from 4.3 per cent in 1990 to
72 per cent in 1995 (World Bank,
1996l,. The surge and regional concentuation of private capital flows have

been driven by the forces of
globalisation of product markets, ftnancial integration and technological

innovation. Although Nigeria and
South Africa have accounted for most

of the private capital going to subsharan Africa, other counhies are
likely to attract private capital flows
by undertaking sustained reform and

privatisation programmes and resolving their external debt problem.
Associatedwith the issue of private
capitil is tfre problem of capital flight

which has depleted the supply of
much needed financing. During the
period 1975-91, capital flight from
Cote d'lvoire, Morocco and Nigeria

Finally, African countries would

was estimated at US$36 billion (ADB,

need to increase sharply the level and
efficiency of private investment if the
goal of economic recovery is to be
achieved. Gross domestic investment

79941. Capital flight can be reducefl
or reversed by policies to curb inflationary pressures, avoid overvaluation

I of sub-saharan Africa has declined
I

the same period (Table 1). More wor-

from 22 per cent of GDP in 1981 to
16 per cent in 1993 while the investment ratio of East Asia has increased
from 29 percent to 36 percent over

of the exchange rate and foster finan-

cial intermediation.

Foreign aid is neither a dependable nor a desirable source of externalfinancing. Africa needs trade not
aid. Total Official Development As-
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sistance (ODA) dgcline-d from
us$47.4 billion iniggq to US$47

billion in 1995 or 20o/o of total external financing. In recent years, SubSaharan Africa has been the largest
recipient of ODA amounting to US The Role of Domestic
$16.9 billion in 1995. The prospects Financial Institutions
for foreign aid are grim as most of the
major donor counties are cutting their Financial markets and institutions
aid budgets and are insisting on de- perform many important functions in
mocratization as a prior condition for both developed and developing
granting additional assistance.
counfties. They hansfer funds from
Another presiing issue is the exter- savers to borrowers, agglomerate
nal debt burden of heavily indebted capital, select projects, monitor and
poor African counhies that have no enforce conhacts,.pool risks and run
access to private capital markets or the payments system. These funcnon concessional flows. In 1995, the tions are performed by a wide range
external debt to GNP ratio for Sub- of institutions including money lendSaharan Africa averaged 74per cenl ers, banks, specialised lending instias compared with 29 per cent for East tutions, insurance companies, penfuia. However, when South Africa is sion funds, brokerage houses, investexcluded, the ratio increases to 119 ment and unit husts and stock exper cent which is clearly unsustainable.
changes. A large share of the financial
Many African countries have bgn- assets in most African counhies are
efited from debt reduction by bilat- held in banks, although informaland
eral creditors under the Paris Club semi-formal financial institutions caNbples terms and debt forgiveness ter for the credit needs of small and
under the debt relief initiative an- micro enterprises.
nounced by France in connection
Some Financial Policy Issues
with the devaluation of the CFA
franc. Regrettably, the multilateral
creditors namely the World Bank, the As a component of structuraladjustInternationalMonetary Fund and the ment, many African countries have
African Development Bank have implemented financial sector reforms
persistently refused to grant debt re- that included the deregulation of inlief even to the severely indebted terest rates, the licensing of new banks
poor countries of Africa. Despite their and the abolition of direct credit
large stocks of accumulated reserves problems. While the measures were
and callable capital, these institutions intended to improve the efficiency of
have often advanced specious argu- banking operations, they have also
ments that any rescheduling of their contributed to the spread of banking
loans will set a dangerous precedent distress, the erosion of public confior will adversely affect the high rating dence in banks and the stagnation of
of their bonds on the international private investment. To support the
capital markets. As 30.0 per cent of strategy for economic recovery, it is
Africa's long-term debt is owed to necessary to re-examine aspects of
these institutions, an early and lasting financial sector reform with particular
resolution of the multilateral debt ref.erence to the effect of interest rate
problem willbring much succor to the on household saving and the adverse
heavily indebted countries of Africa. effects of competition policy on the
Given the niggardly behaviour of the solvency of banks.
There is no consensus among
multilateral institutions on the debt
problem, it may wellbe necessary to economists on the effect of interest
56

rate on Saving. Nevertheless, SAFhas often piescribed the use of positive real interest rates as a device for

review the governance and management of thdse insfltutioni to reflect
better the interest of their valued customers.

mobilising additional household saving. Unfortunately, African counhies
that followed this advice experienced
no significant increase in their na-

tional saving. Indeed, a recent em,
piricalstudy has shown that the im.
pact of increases in real interest rates
on household saving behaviour is
quite small in low-income counhies
(Ostry, 1995). To achieve higher
national saving, African countries
should consider alternative policies
such as reducing the government
budget deficit, reducing the leveland
volatility of inflation and introducing
mandatory saving programmes.
The roots of banking dishess can
be haced to many factors including
the adverse effect of adjustment policies on the profitability of client companies, poorprudential regulation and

i

;
I
I

supervisio4, inadequate legal systems

andincompetentandfraudulentbank
management. In manyAfrican counhies, the problem of banking distress
was worsened by policies such as the
deregulation of interest rates and the
liberal licensing of banks that were
intended to promote competition and
efficiency in the banking industry.
Banking distress has become a cancerous menace eroding public confidence in banks and retarding the
process of financial integration in
many countries. For example, out of
a total of 116 licensed commercial
and merchant banks in Nigeria in the
firstquarter of 1995, fifty-seven banks
holding 25 per cent of total bank
deposits were severely distressed
(Ebhodaghe, 1995). While urgent
steps should be taken to rationalise
and recapitalise insolvent banks, due
attention should be given to the fundamental causes of banking distress.
Development Finance
Institutions

In most African countries, the

risk
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of banks have revealed three
distinctive features. Firstly, the matu-

assets

rity structure of loans and advances is

mostly short-term with the bulk of
loans being repayable within twelve

months. Secondly, the majority of
loans are granted to the commercial
sector r,vith a smaller share going to
the manufacturing and agricultural
sectors. Thirdly, the size distribution
of borrowers shows a marked preference for lending to large firms. Small
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)are
considered too risky and are required
to provide collateral security and to
meet more stringent loan conditions.
To speed up the process of development, many African countries have
sought to overcome these shortcom-

ings through the establishment of
Development Finance Institutions
(DFIs) to channel long-term finance
to priority sectors including SMEs,
agriculturai and manufacturing sectors. As a tool of industrial promotion, policy-based finance is likely to

economic recovery. There is clearly a
need to revamp their operational
procedures, to appoint comPetent
and committed management and
staff and to reduce political interference. But it is equally important that
urgent steps be taken to clean up
their balance sheets and inject fresh
capital to enable DFIs to contribute
their quota to the task of economic
rccovery. Where budgetary funds are
tight, DFIs should befree to diversify

into deposit taking and investment
banking and to provide most of their
services on a fully commercialized
basis. In particular, they should ensure that interest rate spreads on
their loans are adequate to cover the
costs of loan processing and default.
DFIs should also consider the setting
up of subsidiaries to provide equipment leasing and venture capital

operations after a careful study of
their commercial viabilip.

Informal Finance

be more efficient than fiscal subsidies

since DFIs are expected to screen
loan applicatiogs,,carefully and ensure that projects are properly appraised and implemented. DFIs mobilised resources, often in foreign
currency and on concessional terms,
from the Government and multilateral financial institutions.
In recent years, the clients of DFIs
have operated in relatively high-risk
sectors which have been devastated
by declining terms of hade, large
exchange rate devaluation, high interest rates and protracted economic
recession. In many countries, political interference in the appointmentof
top management and in the selection
of projects worsened the problem of
non-performing loans while inadequate bankruptcy laws frustrated
loan recovery efforts. As a result,
many DFIs have been closed down
while others are insolvent and severely distressed.
In my view, the strategic objectives
of DFIs are highly relevant for Africa's
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It may well be inappropriate for micro enterprises, artisans and small
farmers to borrow from formal credit
institutions. For this class of borrowers, lending and collateral requirements of banks are onerous. For the
banks. the costs of appraising and
monitoring very small loans are so
prohibitive that they would rather
prefer to refuse the loan request.
Informal and semi-formal institutions have sprung up in many countries to cater for this niche market. Of
particular significance are the Rotational Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) which have operated like smallcredit unions. ROSCAs

go by various names in Africa. They
are called esusu and adashi in Nigeria, tontine in Niger and Benin,
Ikub in Ethiopia, chilemba in Malawi

and Zambia and susu in Ghana.
Members of the association make a
fixed periodic contribution to the
savings fund which entitles them to
withdraw money on a rotationalba-

.l996

Small and micro enterprises can
also obtain short-term credit from
moneylenders and pawnbrokers but
such loans are ofterr provided at very

sis.

high interest rates.

Notwithstanding the implementation of financialderegulation in many
countries, there is ample evidence
that the informal financial institutions
have continued to thrive as they sell
services which banks are unwilling or
unable to provide. In Ghana, over
500 ROSCAs in Accra have formed
the Greater Accra Susu Collectors

Cooperative Society (GASCCS)
which has proved very effective in
mobilising savings through the daily
collection of deposits.
The challenge for Africa's financial
development is to device appropriate
ways of integrating the formzrl and
informal sectors in order to foster
financialdeepening. One option is to
set up semi-formal institutions which
carry out more structural financial
activities based on group lending and
cooperative finance. Semi-formal institutions have operated successfully
in some Asian countries. Like other
rural finance instih-rtions, the Grameen
Bank (GB) in Bangladesh, the Bank

for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand and
the Badan Kredit Kecamatan (BKK)
in Indonesia were established to promote growth in low-income ruralsectors by providing affordabie credit to
local farmers. These institutions have

attained high loan repayment rates

and are moving towards selfsustainability.

The Grameen Bank represents an
outstanding case of effective lending
to the rural poor. ln L994, the Bank
served half of all villages in Bangladesh and had a total membership of
over two million, of whom 94 per
cent were poor rural women. Women

received over 90 per cent of total
cumulative disbursement of Taka
44,640 million (US$1.1 billion) and
accounted for 76 per cent of all savings mobilised by the Bank. The Bank
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had a network
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of 1,045

branches

staffed by 10,861 employees and has

recorded profits at the programme
level since 1986 (Khandker, 1995).
Although it has received grants from
international donors, the Grameen
Bank has achieved a record of broad
membership, extensive outreach and
financial sustainability and can be
considered a good role model for
other developing counhies.

THE ROLE OF CAPITAL
MARKETS
African Stock Exchanges

As at the end of 1994, stock exchanges were operating in thirteen
African countries namely, Botswana,
Cote d'lvoire, Eglpt, Ghana, Kenya,

talisation of US$12,890 million that
is 35 per cent greater than the market
capitalisation of the Namibian Stock
Exchange, the second largest African
stock market. The total market capi-

talisation of all other African stock
exchanges amount less than one fifth
of the market capitalisation of the
JSE.

The number of listed companies
affects market size and investor inter-

est. The Cairo Stock Exchange has
the greatest number of listed companies (700) followed by the JSE (640)
and the Nigeria stock exchange (177\.
The number of listed companies is
determined by several factors including the age of the stock exchange, the
costs and requirements for listing, the
relative cost of loan and equity capital
and government action to encourage

Zimbabwe (Table 2). Apart from a
few stock exchanges in Northern and
Southern Africa, the emerging stock
markets of Africa are generally small,
volatile, illiquid and inexperienced.
Without an appreciable increase in
the size and number of listed companies and marked improvement in the
regulatory framework and trading and

listing. The Cairo Stock Exchange
and the JSE are over 100 years old
whereas the stock markets of Botswana, Ghana and Swaziland with
less than 20listed companies are less
than 10 years old. Government assisted the listing of companies in Nigeria through the programmes of
indigenisation and privatisation and
in Egypt through the mandatory listing of certain categories of compa-

settlement systems, these markets are

nies.

unlikely to attract the interest of domestic and foreign investors and institutions. Although the implementation of privatisation programmes and
economic reform policies have created new investment opportunities,
these markets would face a great
challenge in mobilising adequate resources for economic recovery.
By a wide margin, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is the
iargest African stock market with 640
listed companies and market capitaiisation of US$226 billion at the end of
7994, equivalent to 191 per cent of
GDP. Indeed, the JSE was ranked as
the eleventh largest stock exchange
in the worid (lnternational Finance
Corporation, 1995). Anglo-American
Corporation, the largest listed company on the JSE, has a market capi-.

Liquidity, reflecting market depth
and the physicalability to trade. is a
key test of market success. Market
liquidity, by narrowing the bid/ask
spread, tends to reduce both trading
costs and market volatility. Morocco,
Tunisia and Zimbabwe have the most
liquid stock markets while Namibia,
Nigeria and Swaziland have the least
liquid. Relative to their age and size.
the stock markets of Nigeria and South
Africa are highly illiquid. In apartheid
South Africa. exchange controls were
imposed to curtail capital outflows
but they also resulted in a network of

Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria.
South Africa, Swaziland, Tunisia and
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equity cross-holdings and market
illiquidity. Democratic South Africa
has to dismantle exchange controls
to improve market liquidity. In Nigeria, a substantialproportion of equities are held by institutional inves-

tors and foreign corporations that
adopt a "buy and hold" policy and
display a market reluctance to trade.
Although stock markets are larggly
driven by economic fundamentals,
some studies have shown that institutional features, namely the regulatory, trading and settlement systems
can influence hading and price behaviour through their effect on market liquidity, efficiency and trading
costs (Glen, 1994). Owing to their

low trading level and small listing,
most of the emerging markets in Af-

rica have adopted a simple trading
system called periodic call auction or
call-over. The more advanced continuous auction systems such as the
open outcry and elechonic screen
system have been adopted in South
Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Kenya.
Many African stock exchanges are
aiming at T+3 settlement in line with
G30 recommenciations while the JSE.

Cairo, Mauritius and Nairobi stock
exchanges are planningto establish a
central depository system to modernise their share delivery and settlement system.

Issues in Capital Markets

Development
Although the emerging stock markets
of Africa are illiquid, small and inefficient, they have posted impressive

records of market performance. In
1994, Kenya, Nigeria and Egypt
topped the world ranking of stock
market performance with increases
in price indexes in US dollars of 179
per cent, 168.8 per cent and 167.2
per cent, respectively (lFC, 1995).
Tunisia. Ghana and Mauritius were
ranked in fifth, sixth and eight positions. This spectacular market performance notwithstanding, Sub-Sa.
haran Africa attracted only 3 per cent
of gross porlfolio flows to developing
countries in 1994-95 (World Bank,
7996).

The privatisation of state owned
enterprises has served atested means

of athacting foreign equity invest-

'1996
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ment while conhibuting to the growth
and liquidity of domestic capitalmar-

kets. In mid 1994, the Ghanaian
Government offered part of its holding in the Ashanti Goldfields Company Limited (AGC) on the London
and Accra stock exchanges. At the
end of \994, AGC was ranked the
largest company in Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa with a
market capitalisation of US$1,574
million and nearly 34,000 shareholders worldwide. AGC has accounted
for over 91 per cent of the market
capitalisation of the Accra Stock Exchange that has performed better than
the Nigerian Stock Exchange in terms
of relative size and turnover ratio
despite its young age of 6 years. In
another case of successful privatisa-

tion, the Kenyan Government has
offered to the Dutch national carrier
KLM, a 26 per cent state in Kenya
Airways that was a loss making stateowned airline. KLM provided much
needed capital, management and
marketing skills to Kenya Airways
which has since been floated on the

London qnd Nairobi

stock
exchanges.The floatation of the
Ashanti Goldfield Company Limited
and Kenya Airways shows that successful privatisation is a non zerosum game with ample benefits to the
privatised company, the Government
and the stock exchange.

While the gains from successful
privatisations are quite tempting, it is
necessary to mention two possible
demerits of capital markets, namely a
myopic approach to corporate governance and the volatility of portfolio
investment.
To raise long-term debt and equity
capital, companies can rely on banks
or the capital markets. The universal
banks of continental Europe hold large

equity stakes in major corporations
and serve as directors on their supervising boards. In Germany and Japan, commercial banks ensure that
their corporate clients act in line with
the Government's industrial policy
and seek to protect the interest of all
the stakeholders of the company in-
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cluding workers, suppliers, creditors
and customers. When their corporate clients fall on hard times, the
banks work closely with manage-

ment to find long term solutions.
However, in ttie U. S. A. and U.K.
where capital markets 4re dominant,
brokers and institutional investors are
responsible for monitoring corporate
performance with a prime objective

of maximizing short-term profitability. A corporate management that
fails to produce satisfactory shortterm results is promptly replaced
through hostile takeover bids.
Another possible demerit of capital market development is the
destabilising effects of portfolio investment flows. The athaction of
emerging capital markets to institutional investors derives more from
the needJo re-adjust their exposure
limits in various instruments and
markets in line with changes in interest rates and exchange rates developments in developed markets rather

than responding to policies and incentives in emerging markets. For
example, in late 1994 Mexico experienced a massive withdrawal of
portfolio investment by institutional
investors following a large increase in
U. S. interests rates. Notwithstanding
a 15 per cent devaluation of the
peso, the capital outflow continued
untilJanuary, 1995 when the U. S.
Government announced a US$50
billion international rescue package
for Mexico.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that the liberal

market policies of shuctural adjustment have failed to revive private
investment and economic growth in
Africa and has called for an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP)
for Africa. In the light of the diverse
institutional and resource constraints
facing the countries in the region, no
common strategy can work for all
countries but the broad outline of a
recovery programme can be indicated. It is the duty of Government to
articulate a shared strategic vision of

economic recovery and communicate same to the major stakeholders
in the polity. The proposed strategy
should be market-friendly and people-cenhed and should aim at promoting exports and SMEs.
For pragmatic reasons, the financing of economic recovery should rely
heavily on domestic financial institu-

tions although the widespread dishess presenfly affecting commercial
banks and development finance institutions will complicate this task.
The agenda for financial reform
should aim at mobilising household
saving, restoring the solvency of
banks, restucturing and recapitalising

DFIs and integrating the formal and
informal financial sectors.
Africa needs bade not aid. As most
African counhies belong to the class
of severely indebted low-income
counhies, their external debt burdens are unsustainable and the
granting of debt stock reduction and
forgiveness by bilateral and multilateral creditors is necessary for the restoration of country credit worthiness.
A well structured privatisation programme can attract much needed
foreign capital and management skill
while shengthening the fledgling stock
markets of Africa.

A thick and pregnant cloud has
been hanging over Africa. The cloud
can lift and yield sunlight, prosperity
and freedom. But it can also thicken

and produce flodd, abject poverty
and doom. Divine intervention notwithstanding, the choice of outcome
and policy lies largely in the hands of
Africa.

Two and half millennia ago, Confucius warned: "To err and not re-

form may indeed be called error".
The neoclassical paradigm of laissez-

faire and its related programme of
structural adjustment have proved
counter-productive and have led Africa into a cul-de-sac. In implementing SAP, Africa has erred but must
find the courage and faith to beat a
true path of reform. Not to heed the
advice of the Chinese sage will only
lead Africa into a fatalerror.
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. Table 1
SELECTED DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS BY REGION
GNP Per

Gross

Capita

Domestic
Investment
(o/o

US$

1981
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia

South Asia

(at,t of.

7.7

74.1

5.0

36.0

17.2

18.8

29.0

98.1

22.0

9.8

11.9

38.8

6.0

36.1

t7.3

40.2

6.8

39.6

33.9

16.0

820

29.4

310

23.7

2,320

_

27.6

25.6

(US$

11.0

27.6

Middle East & North

of

1993

340

2,580 2,450_

((Yo

Private
Capital
flows

billion)

1981

Europe & CentralAsia

External
Debt

GNP)
1995

GDP)

GDP)
1981 1993

1993

600
420
270

of

Private
Investment

23.7

10.9*

12.6"

1995

Africa

Latin An-rerica & Caribbean

2,220

2,950

24.6 19.5

13.7 13.9

Note: *Data refer to Europe, Middle East and North Africa (EMENA)
Source:The World Bank, World Development Report 1995
The World Bank, World Debt Tables 1996, Vol. 1
International Finance Corporation,Building the Private Sector in Africa, 1995
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Table2:
AFRICAN STOCK MARKET INDICATORS
Market
Capitalisation

of
(GDP)

(o/o

(US$ mil)

Value
Traded
Turnover
(US$
Ratio
mil.)
Companies

Listed

Year
Established

African Markets

t91.2

225,718
9,574
4,376
4,263

South Africa
Namibia
Morocco
Egvpt
Kenya
Nigeria
Tunisia
Ghana
Zimbabwe
Mauritius
Cote d'lvoire
Botswana
Swaziland

3,081

2,771
2,561
1,873

7,828
1,514
428
377
338

640

15,954

14

18

369.1
L4.8

6l

788

10.1

700

47.6
8.3
16.8
35.3
35.9
45.0
7.9
9.5
36.2

56
777

358
62

79.6
91.1

7,770

18

2l

296
75
L76
85

L7

64
35
30

L2

31
2

11

4

8.5
0.3
22.1
8.9
2.6
0.8

t7.0
3.7
11.5
7.4
3.7
8.2
0.6

1887

7992
1929
1883

1954
1960
1937
1990

7896
1989

t976
1989
1990

Some Developed
Markets
5,081,810
3,719,914
1,210,245
451,263
470,519

U. S. A.
Japan
United Kingdom
France

Germany
Notes:

Lt6.t
35.0
24.7

2,205
2,070
459
417

3,592,668
L,127,438
928,1.77

615,37L
460,617

t792

70.7
30.1
78.1
133.9

1949
1802

97.9

1585

1.702

o
t,"

G

1.

Market Capitalisation is share price times the number of shares outstanding at end 1994in millions of US dollars and as per
cent of GDP.

2.

Limited Companies is number of companies with equities listed at end 1994.

3.

Value Traded is total value of shares traded in 7994 in millions of US Dollars

4.

Turnover Ratio is total value of shares traded in 1.994 as a per cent of average market capitalisation in 7994 calculated in
local currency. Average market capitalisation in the simple average of the end-of-period values for th, .urrent period and
the previous period.

Source: InternationalFinanceCorporation,

Emerqinq Stock

(ASEA). Factbook on Member Exchanqes. 1995
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Factbook 1995. African stock Exchanqe Association

